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SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE IST ON TRIAL:
THE CASE FOR THE ICC
Heidi M. Spalholz*
INTRODUCTION
Acts of genocide have terrorized humanity since the inception of
mankind.1 While genocide has persisted throughout the centuries, it is only
in the last century that its malevolence has been recognized and addressed
in the hopes of deterrence. 2 Generally, those responsible for organizing and
mobilizing such mass atrocities are heads of state, who up until the last
century have enjoyed immunity for their actions.' Only recently has interna-
tional law developed the ability to hold former heads of state accountable
for crimes against humanity. It is not surprising that issues of "how" and
"when" to try perpetrators of crimes against humanity have not been solved.
Accordingly, it was not denied that Saddam Hussein should be held ac-
countable for his crimes against humanity, but rather the question how he
was to be held accountable was subject to much debate.
The Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) was tasked with trying Saddam
Hussein. On a broad level, the IST is significant in that it solidified newly
developed parameters of head-of-state immunity; shifting the traditional
concepts of head-of-state immunity to a modern head of state accountabil-
ity. However, the Hussein trial also serves to illustrate that head of state
accountability is applied in a dichotomous fashion - exempting some while
aggressively pursuing others. Such a dichotomy results in the branding of
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ester Institute of Technology, 2004; B.S., Rochester Institute of Technology, 2003.
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1 MICHAEL J. KELLY, NOWHERE TO HIDE: DEFEAT OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
DEFENSE FOR CRIMES OF GENOCIDE AND THE TRIALS OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
AND SADDAM HUSSEIN 7 (2005) (explaining that the book of Genesis, the first book
of the Bible, narrates the first genocide whereby God "cleansed" the earth of every
living creature with the exception of Noah, his family, and the animals on the ark).
2 Id.
3 Jamison G. White, Note, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Augusto Pi-
nochet, Universal Jurisdiction, the ICC and a Wake-Up Call for Former Heads of
State, 50 CASE W. RES. 127 at 174 (1999).
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head of state tribunals as "victor's revenge."4 This attacks the scrutinizing
world's view of the core legitimacy of the trial; a perceived legitimacy
which is necessary not only in the broad sense of affirming the human
rights movement, but also in the narrower sense of the future of the Iraqi
people and nation as a whole. In addition, The IST has been criticized with
having serious procedural and substantive flaws.5 Hussein's trial also illus-
trates the world's need for a consistent, swift, and fair application of inter-
national law once crimes against humanity have been committed; a task
which would be best served by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The problems with the IST, in particular the procedural and sub-
stantive problems, are inherent to domestic tribunals tasked with trying
heads of state for crimes against humanity. Domestic tribunals are not ex-
perienced or equipped in the areas of international law and procedure which
are necessary to try such complex cases. A strengthened and supported ICC
ultimately leads to global recognition of human rights, and a universally
accepted form of restrictive head-of-state immunity. This global recognition
will result in a "trickle down" effect in which individual states adopt the
principles set forth by the ICC. In theory, a strengthened ICC would en-
courage individual states to develop domestic legislature and procedures
which recognize and address crimes against humanity and a restrictive form
of head-of-state immunity. Therefore, by examining the IST and its prose-
cution of Saddam Hussein, the conclusion of this paper is that the ICC
should be wholeheartedly supported and endorsed by states in the hope that
individual nation states will develop their own internal laws and procedures
to swiftly address and ultimately deter egregious crimes against humanity.
OUTLINE OF ANALYSIS
The first section of this comment discusses the erosion of head-of-
state immunity to a restrictive form of head-of-state immunity. An under-
standing of head-of-state immunity is important in regards to the Hussein
Trial as it establishes a foundation for the IST's jurisdiction over Saddam
Hussein. Next the significance of fair and just trials for criminals who com-
mit crimes against humanity is discussed. The debate surrounding various
options of trying heads of states for crimes against humanity is then dis-
I Mary Margaret Penrose. It's Good to be King! Prosecuting Heads of State and
Former Heads of State under International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193,
206-207 (2000-2001) ("Nuremberg is an exemplary testament to 'victor's justice,'"
defining victor s justice as "the spoils of war... meted out by the victors of war").
5 See generally 18 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH No. 9, JUDGNG DUJAIL: THE FIRST
TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL (Nov. 2006), available at http://hrw.org/
reports/2006/iraq 1106/.
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cussed as applied to trying Saddam Hussein. Critiques of the current IST
are next briefly addressed. It is concluded that the ICC is the best venue
available to adjudicate Saddam Hussein. In particular, it is emphasized that
support and endorsement of the ICC by individual states ultimately contrib-
utes to the development of domestic laws and procedures of addressing
crimes against humanity in individual nation states.
HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY SHIFrS TO HEAD-OF-STATE ACCOUNTABILITY
In order to understand head-of-state immunity, an examination of
its foundation, state sovereignty, is necessary. Previously notorious heads of
state could hide behind the veil of head-of-state immunity, shielding them-
selves from any accountability for their atrocious actions. Only recently
have former heads of state been held accountable for their actions. The first
explanation of head-of-state immunity appeared in The Schooner Exchange
v. McFadden decision. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Marshall explained that
heads of state were immune from arrest in a foreign sovereign as they were
not "intending to subject (themselves) to a jurisdiction incompatible with
his dignity, and the dignity of his nation. ' ' 6 Head-of-state immunity is also
closely linked to diplomatic immunity. While head-of-state immunity, dip-
lomatic immunity, and state sovereign immunity are strongly related, the
three concepts have diverged into three distinct doctrines. 7
Analyzing the parameters of and distinctions between diplomatic
immunity and state immunity may help to clarify the evolution of head-of-
state immunity. An historical examination of the status of head-of-state im-
munity from the Nuremberg trials on to the Pinochet case is also significant
in evaluating the erosion and application of head-of-state immunity.
State Sovereignty
While the origins of head-of-state immunity are not precisely
known, it is believed that it developed hand in hand with the immunity
granted to sovereign states.' Traditionally, a ruler and his country were le-
gally deemed inseparable. 9 Under the original core notions of state sover-
6 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon & Others, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).U.S. See
also HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 438 (2002).
7 Michael A. Tunks, Note, Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of
Head-of-State InmunitY, 52 DUKE L.J. 651, 652 (2002).
8 Id. See also Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate; ex parte Pinochet
(1999) 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) (U.K.).
9 Jerrold L. Mallory, Note, Resolving the Confusion over Heads of State Inmu-
nity: The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 170 (1986).
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eignty, a sovereign state was afforded absolute immunity and could not be
tried without its consent.10 This concept of absolute state immunity reflects
the fundamental principle that all sovereigns are equal under international
law, 1 and that subjecting a state to a foreign court's jurisdiction would
undermine this principle.' 2 A ruler's liability was likened to that of their
sovereign nation's liability, and both were deemed immune. The rationale is
that since acts undertaken by the head of state ultimately "constitute acts of
the state, the head of state must be subsumed into the latter's immunity."' 3
However, recent interpretations show that state immunity and head-of-state
immunity are diverging. 14 Heads of states and their respective states no
longer have the same relationship as they once did. Originally, a head of
state's actions were those of the state, carried out by a tangible actor. To-
day, the current role of a head of state depends on the practices of their
respective state. 15 As Hazel Fox points out "on one hand, the functions of
monarchs such as those of the United Kingdom, The Netherlands . . .. of
Presidents, such as those of Austria, Germany ... and of Emperors ... are
largely ceremonial, although they may retain some residuary constitutional
function. On the other hand, the Kings of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Mo-
rocco continue to exercise political power."'16
The immunity afforded sovereign states has eroded as the activities
states encompass have grown to include not only political activities but also
economic affairs.'7 This has resulted in many states adopting a doctrine of
restrictive sovereign immunity: granting immunity to foreign states in re-
spect to their governmental acts, yet not granting immunity to states in re-
10 Tunks, supra note 7, at 653 (citing PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (7th ed. 1997). For a thorough exami-
nation of the immunity of states see generally Fox, supra note 6.
1 See generally U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1, available at http://www.un.org/
aboutun/charter/.
12 Tunks, supra note 7.
13 Kerry Creque O'Neill, A New Customary Law of Head of State Immunity? Hi-
rohito and Pinochet, 38 STAN. J INT'L L. 289, 292 (2002) (quoting Hazel Fox, The
Pinochet Case No.3, 48 INT'L COMp. L.Q. 687, 694 (1999)).
"4 Mallory, supra note 9, at 170-71.
5 Fox, supra note 6 at 422. Fox notes that it is impossible to generalize the roles
of head of states.
16 Id. Fox points out that a state may have more then one head of state, as a there
may be a head of the executive, legislative or other various branches.
17 PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 119 (7th ed. 1997).
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spect to their commercial acts.18 Since head-of-state immunity had formerly
been associated with state sovereignty, establishing clear rules for head-of-
state immunity early on did not seem necessary. 19 As the erosion of state
sovereign immunity occurred, the status of head-of-state immunity came
into question.
Diplomatic Immunity
A form of restrictive immunity for diplomats20 has been laid out in
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 21 Diplomats are ab-
solutely immune from criminal prosecution by the receiving state and are
restrictively immune in regards to civil suits. 22 A diplomat is immune from
civil suit only if their action does not relate to their private commercial
activities or their own private property. 23 In other words, a diplomat is im-
mune in regards to civil and administrative jurisdiction only if the activity
relates to their official functions. 24 However, Article 32 of the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations grants the sending state the power to
waive their diplomat's immunity.25
The rationale behind granting broad immunity to diplomats is that
diplomatic immunity is necessary for diplomats to act freely to ensure har-
monious relations between states.2 6 The preamble of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations stresses that the purpose of diplomatic immunity is
"to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions
"27
i Id. It is important to note that not all countries adhere to the theory of restrictive
immunity for sovereign states, but continue to observe absolute sovereign immu-
nity. Id.
19 Tunks, supra note 7, at 655.
20 A diplomat is defined as "the head of the mission or a member of the diplo-
matic staff of the mission." Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 1,
Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna].
21 Id. at art. 29-38, See also MALANCZUK, supra note 17, at 123 ("Most of the
provisions of the Convention seek to codify customary law, and can therefore be
used as evidence of customary law even against states which are not parties to the
Convention.").
22 Vienna, supra note 20, at art. 31.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id., at art. 32.
26 Tunks, supra note 7, at 654 (pointing out that without diplomatic immunity,
international relations would suffer).
27 Vienna, supra note 20, at preamble.
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Impact of Sovereign and Diplomatic Immunity on Head-of-State Immunity
The rationale behind the doctrine of head-of-state immunity is ex-
pressed in the rationales of sovereign and diplomatic immunity. Head-of-
state immunity is necessary as a symbol of a state's sovereign independence
and also serves to ensure that heads of state can perform their diplomatic
duties unhindered. 28 Strong arguments have been made both for a strong
and diluted form of a head-of-state immunity doctrine. Supporters of abso-
lute head-of-state immunity argue that heads of state must have freedom in
order to perform their diplomatic functions, and cite leaders such as Ariel
Sharon who was unable to visit the European Union Headquarters for fear
that he might be arrested.29 Some of the loudest arguments for head-of-state
immunity stem from those who may benefit from it themselves. For exam-
ple, Henry Kissinger, has argued that prosecutions against heads of state or
government officials may be fueled by political purposes, creating a situa-
tion where international prosecution is used to pursue political vendettas
rather then pursuing justice.30 However this argument is tarnished by the
fact that Kissinger himself relies on the shield of head-of-state immunity for
his own previous actions. 1
Arguments against an absolute form of head-of-state immunity
stem from the promotion of human rights in international law, and the cor-
responding erosion of state sovereignty. International law began to recog-
nize that fundamental crimes such as genocide cannot be violated, and that
all nations have jurisdiction over the violators of such crimes.3 2 The doc-
28 Tunks, supra note 7, at 654. See also Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d 1209 at 1252
("The rationale behind the doctrine is to promote international comity and respect
among sovereign nations by ensuring that leaders are free to perform their govern-
mental duties without being subject to detention, arrest, or embarrassment in a for-
eign country's legal system.")
29 Tunks, supra note 7, at 656-57 (citing Herb Keinon, Israel Compiling List of
States With 'Universal Jurisdiction', U.S.JERUSALEM POST, July 27, 2001 at 4A).
30 HENRY A. KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? 273-74
(2001).
31 KELLY, supra note 1, at 81-82 (analyzing the strength of Kissinger's arguments
for head-of-state immunity and referencing Christopher Hitchens' assertion of Kis-
singer's responsibility in the 1975 genocide in East Timor and the 1973 carpet
bombing of Cambodia). See also, CNN.COM, UK Bid at Arrest Kissinger Fails
(Apr. 22, 2002), available at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/04/22/
uk.kissinger/.
32 Hari M. Osofsky, Note, Domesticating International Criminal Law: Bringing
Human Rights Violators to Justice, 107 YALE L. J. 191, 205 (1998) (citation
omitted).
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trine of universal jurisdiction provides "that claims arising from universally
condemned conduct are within the subject matter jurisdiction of all courts,
regardless of the location or nationality of the parties."33 The application of
universal jurisdiction results in compromising a state's sovereignty. As
Richard Haass has explained, "[slovereignty entails obligations. One is not
to massacre your own people . . . [i]f a government fails to meet these
obligations, then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sovereignty,
including the right to be left alone inside your own territory. '3 4 As interna-
tional law increasingly recognized human rights, sovereign states and heads
of state consequently consented to limitations on their immunity.
Former Heads of State
The status of head-of-state immunity is further complicated when it
is analyzed in regards to current and former heads of state, particularly in
the realm of criminal liability. 35 Generally, current heads of state enjoy
absolute immunity in regards to criminal proceedings while they are in of-
fice. 36 Once a head of state leaves office, they enjoy continued immunity
from criminal liability only for "official acts undertaken while in office in
his or her official capacity."37 The Rome Statute of the ICC explicitly de-
nies immunity to sitting heads of state for crimes against humanity.3 8 How-
ever no nation has actually passed judgment against a sitting head of state.39
Therefore courts are more likely to subject former heads of state to their
33 Jeffrey Rabkin, Note, Universal Justice: The Role of Federal Courts in Inter-
national Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2120, 2139 (1995). See also Michael
P. Davis, Note, Accountability and World Leadership: Impugning Sovereign Im-
munity, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 1357, 1368 (1999) ("The doctrine was first developed
to justify the assertion of jurisdiction over pirates who, by definition, were outside
of the territorial jurisdiction of any particular country but were, at the same time, a
burden on all nations.") (citations omitted).
34 Nicholas Lemann, Letter from Washington: The Next World Order, THE NEW
YORKER, April 1, 2002, at 42, 45-46.
35 KELLY, supra note 1, at 83 ("It should be noted. that courts remain ready to
recognize immunity defenses as a complete bar to civil suit for heads of state, even
after they have left office.").
36 KELLY, supra note 1, at 78.
37 Id.
38 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at art. 27, July 17, 1998,
,U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1010 ("[O]fficial capacity as Head of
state or Government... shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibil-
ity under this Statute.") [hereinafter ICC Statute].
39 Tunks, supra note 7, at 663.
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jurisdiction than they are current heads of state, even when dealing with
criminal acts of grave proportion, such as genocide.4 0 This reticence in itself
creates a strong argument for the erosion of current head-of-state immunity,
as tyrannical leaders who commit mass atrocities may attempt to hold onto
power as long as possible in order to evade prosecution.
Head-of-State Immunity in Practice
States' application of head-of-state immunity to former and current
heads of state who have violated criminal international law illustrates the
recent shift towards limiting head-of-state immunity: 41 "While there is no
formal recognition of stare decisis in international law, cases can become
reflective of existing norms and thereby persuasively mandatory in their
own right. " 42
Up until the end of WWII, "international law governed state-to-
state relations, but ... [the] relations between individuals and the States of
which they were nationals were governed only by the national law of those
States, as a matter exclusively within their domestic jurisdiction. '43 The Nu-
remberg Principle established after WWII was the first instance in which
offenders of gross violations were held accountable for their crimes, and a
restricted form of head-of-state immunity was recognized. 44 Principle III of
the Nuremberg Charter specifically provides that "the fact that a person
who committed an international crime acted as Head of State or public offi-
cial does not free him from responsibility under international law or miti-
gate punishment. '45 While Nuremberg laid an initial framework for
40 Id. at 658.
4 1 Adam Isaac Hasson, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immu-
nity on Trial: Noriega, Pinochet, and Milosevic - Trends in Political Accountabil-
itv and Transnational Criminal Law, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 125, 155
(2002).
42 42KELLY, supra note 1, at 118 (citing Raj Bahla, The Myth of Stare Decisis and
International Trade Law, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845, 852-53 (1999)).
43 Davis, supra note 33, at 1364 (quoting A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 2 (3rd ed. 1989)).
44 See Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law, 55
DUKE L.J. 75, 85-86 (2005). "'Throughout most of history victorious states saw no
value in conducting trials of the leaders of vanquished states . leaders were
executed, imprisoned, exiled, or welcomed as guest-hostages." Id. at 85.
45 Principle III, Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,
Supp. No. 12, at 11-14, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
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restrictive head-of-state immunity and recognized accountability for inter-
national war crimes and other gross violations of human decency, it was
blatantly applied to the vanquished while sparing the victor.46 The Nazi's
had committed massive atrocities against humanity, and were rightfully
held accountable for their crimes. However, Nuremberg convicted only 19
persons, leaving a gaping hole in regards to complete criminal liability for
the massive atrocities committed by the Nazis.47 Furthermore with Adolf
Hitler dead, none of the men convicted at Nuremberg were considered
heads of state, leaving the status of head-of-state immunity open for
debate. 48
The Nuremberg trials drew criticism that the allied powers vigor-
ously pursued the Nazis and Japanese while simultaneously taking exten-
sive measures to protect themselves from the Tribunal's jurisdiction.49 At
the Tokyo Tribunal, the Japanese defendants were precluded from using the
tu quoque,50 or "you also," defense. The Japanese application of the tu
quoque defense would have drawn attention and perhaps even accountabil-
ity to the allied forces for the fire-bombing of Tokyo and the nuclear bomb-
ing of Hiroshima. 51 Nuremberg was significant in that it created a basis for
46 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years:
The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM.
Rrs. J. 11, 29 (1997) ( noting that all of the defendants at Nuremberg were
Germans, resulting in a one-sided prosecution); see also Makau Mutua, Never
Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 167, 170-71 ("Nuremberg can be seen as an orchestrated and highly-manipu-
lated forum initiated primarily to impress upon the Nazi leadership who the victors
were and to discredit them as individuals").
47 Mutua, supra note 46, at 172 (emphasizing that the numbers prosecuted in Ger-
many by the Nuremberg Tribunal and others were "too small to account for such
widespread offenses. Prosecution was thus selective ...."). See also Posner, supra
note 44, at 84-85.
48 Penrose, supra note 4, at 194-95.
49 Mutua, supra note 46, at 172.
50 See generally, Glossary of Key Legal Terms, Grotian Moment: The Saddam
Hussein Trial Blog, Case Western School of Law, http://www.law.case.edu/sad-
damtrial/content.asp?id=7 ("Latin for 'you too,' tu quoque is an argument used in
war crimes trials in which the defense argues that 'since you have committed the
same crime, you cannot legitimately prosecute me.' The tu quoque argument was
rejected as an illegitimate defense by the Nuremberg Tribunal and by the Yugosla-
via Tribunal.").
51 E.g., Mutua, supra note 46, at 172. But see, Will Saddam Hussein Get a Fair
Trial? Debate Between Dr. Curtis F. J. Doebbler and Professor Michael P Scharf,
37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 21 [hereinafter Doebbler Scharf Debate] (Professor
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criminal international laws and a restrictive form of head-of-state immunity.
However, Nuremberg also drew criticism that only the vanquished were
held accountable for their actions. 52
As significant as the Nuremberg trials were to the development of
the human rights movement, they were nonetheless tarnished by their hege-
monic prosecution of the vanquished only. While Nuremberg laid the
framework for defining international crimes and restrictive head-of-state
immunity, it left the boundaries of head-of-state immunity unclear.
From the end of WWII to 1990, there was little progress in
defining the status of head-of-state immunity. The Cold
War's realpolitik led nations to ignore crimes against hu-
manity, focusing instead on avoiding confrontations with
one another.53 When assessing developments in interna-
tional law, "it is necessary to look not only at what states
do, but also at what they do not do." 54 The apparent indif-
ference of the international legal communities to interna-
tional crimes created doubt that the status of head-of-state
immunity was shifting from an absolute form to a restric-
tive form.
The parameters of head-of-state immunity swiftly evolved during
the 1990s. 55 In United States v. Noriega,56 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals denied Manuel Noriega head-of-state immunity for the charges of
Scharf states that the tu quoque defense has always been dismissed by International
courts as an invalid defense. "In doing so, they [international courts] say it is true
that in wars and in foreign affairs many countries violate international law, but
when a tribunal is set up to prosecute defendants, the only question is: were these
defendants guilty of the crimes charged?").
52 Peter Rosenblum, Save the Tribunals: Salvage the Movement, A Response to
Makau Mutua, 11 TEMp. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 189, 195 (1997) ("Information contin-
ues to surface each year about how much the Allies knew of the extermination
camps and how easy it would have been to stop them.").
53 Geoffrey Robertson, Ending Impunity: How International Criminal Law Can
Put Tyrants on Trial, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 649, 656. See also, Mutua, supra note
46, at 168-69 ("In the fifty years since Nuremberg, states have shown little stomach
for the international punishment of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and geno-
cide, although treaties and normative canon proscribing such atrocities have
increased.").
54 MALANCZUK, supra note 17, at 43.
55 KELLY, supra note 1, at 80; Tunks, supra note 7, at 658 (citing Curtis A. Brad-
ley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2130 (1999) and Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion
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drug trafficking and ultimately found him accountable for his crimes.5 7 This
case was unique in that a foreign head of state had never before been
brought to the United States to stand trial for an offense committed outside
the United States.5 8 The Noriega case illustrated that heads of state were not
immune from liability for criminal activities not related to their official
acts. 59 However, the Noriega case shed little light on the issue of head-of-
state liability for serious crimes against humanity which can be argued as
official acts.
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the situation in Croatia, Bos-
nia, and Herzegovina escalated to that of crimes against humanity and ge-
nocide. 60 In response, the United Nations Security Council established the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in
1993.61 One of the stated main objectives of the ICTY was to "bring to
justice persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law," including genocide. 62 Article 7 of the Statute of the
ICTY specifically provides that "[t]he official position of any accused per-
son, whether as Head of State... or... Government official, shall not relieve
such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. '63 Indeed,
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, during a visit to the ICTY in 1997
stated that "impunity cannot be tolerated, and will not be. In an interdepen-
dent world, the Rule of the Law must prevail." 64
In 2001, the ICTY approved indictments for war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide for former head of state Slobodan
over Head-of-State Immunity: The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
169, 170 (1986)).
56 United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997).
57 Id.
58 Hasson, supra note 41, at 125.
59 Id. at 142.
60 See generally 16 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH No. 7, JUSTICE AT RISK: WAR
CRIMES TRIALS IN CROATIA, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, AND SERBIA AND MONTE-
NEGRO, (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/icty 1O04/.
61 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), as amended by U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1166 (May 13,1998)[hereinafter Statute of the ICTY].
62 See generally, ICTY AT A GLANCE, available at http://www.un.org/icty/glance-
e/index.htm.
63 ICTY, supra note 61, at art. 7, para. 2.
64 ICTY AT A GLANCE, supra note 62.
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Milosevic. 65 While the death of Milosevic abruptly ended his trial,66 the fact
that Milosevic was denied head-of-state immunity and was prosecuted is
nonetheless significant as it demonstrates a restrictive form of head-of-state
immunity.67
In response to the well documented genocide in Rwanda, 68 the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established. 69 The
ITCR was modeled after, and is substantially similar to the ICTY. 70 Like
the ICTY, the ICTR did not recognize head-of-state immunity as an affirm-
ative defense for defendants. 71 Hence, Jean Kambanda, Rwanda's former
Prime Minister, was convicted of genocide by the ICTR.72 Once again, ab-
solute head-of-state immunity did not shield Kambanda, illustrating that a
restrictive form of immunity is evolving.
While the ICTR and the ICTY were successful in showing that
heads of state can be held accountable for crimes against humanity, they
also drew fierce criticism. 73
65 Prosecutor v. Miloslevic, Indictment, Case no. IT-01-50-I (Nov. 22, 2001)
available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/11122RIE16898.
htm; see also KELLY, supra note 1, at 95-97 (noting that the original indictment did
not charge Milosevic with genocide, but was amended to include genocide after the
prosecutor's successful conviction of a Serb general for the massacre at
Srebrenica).
66 BBC.co.uk, Milosevic suffered heart attack (Mar. 13, 2006), available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4799880.stm. For information on the Milosevic trial,
see http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/.
67 KELLY, supra note 1, at 118.
68 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GE-
NOCIDE IN RWANDA (Mar.1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/
rwanda/.
69 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter "Statute of the ICTR"].
70 Id.
71 Id. at Annex.
72 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S (Sept. 4, 1998) available at
http://www.afrol.com/html/Countries/Rwanda/documents/kambandaverdict_98.
htm (last visited March 25, 2007) (Kambanda pleaded guilty to conspiracy to com-
mit genocide.).
73 C.f Mutua, supra note 46, at 167 (describing the faults and contradictions of
Nuremberg, the ICTY, and the ICTR), with Rosenblum, supra note 52, at 189 (ar-
guing that the tribunals are nonetheless significant in the overarching progression
of the human rights movement, despite the flaws and hypocrisy of the tribunals),
and Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 554, 555 (1995) ("No matter how many atrocities cases these international
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Many argued that the ICTY was established only after the general
public realized the atrocities which had occurred in the former Yugosla-
via.74 Once the general public realized the magnitude of the atrocities via
published and televised reports, "the political will of the major powers was
mobilized by public shame and public outrage, [and only then did the] Se-
curity Council resolutions provide[ ] the legal basis for speedy action. 7
The indifference of the international community to the genocide in Rwanda
was even more severe then seen in the former Yugoslavia.76 This was later
acknowledged by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan who in a report he
commissioned, found both the United Nations and leading member coun-
tries responsible for failing to prevent or end the genocide in Rwanda. 77 In
fact, some scholars acknowledged Western powers as not only ignoring the
genocide in Rwanda, but also as creating and fueling it.78 The tribunals
were consequently viewed as letting powerful states "off the hook" for both
their fueling and subsequent failure to address the human rights violations
which occurred in Rwanda.79 In fact, "[jiudges from some of the very coun-
tries that are regarded as partly 'to blame' for these crimes [were] ... readily
accepted as neutral arbitrators simply because they do not come from
tribunals may eventually try, their very existence sends a powerful message. Their
statutes, rules of procedure and evidence, and practice stimulate the development of
the law.").
74 Mutua, supra note 46, at 174.
75 Id. (quoting journalists of the Yugoslav Tribunal who observed the Security
Council's reactions to published and televised reports of ethnic cleansing "reminis-
cent of Nazi genocide").
76 See Barbara Crossette, Inquiry Says U.N. Inertia in '94 Worsened Genocide in
Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1999, at Al; Mutua, supra note 46, at 176 ("If the
former Yugoslavia suffered from international inaction, the world seemed asleep,
uncaring, as ominous clouds gathered over Rwanda. . "). See generally, LEAVE
NONE TO TELL THE STORY, supra note 68.
77 Crossette, supra note 76, at Al (quoting Kofi Annan).
78 Jose Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 440. (1999) ("[C]olonizers of Rwanda who imported their
racist notions of 'superior races' to Rwanda, need to accept their responsibility for
creating the 'tribalism without tribes' that helped make the genocide possible. . .
[M]uch greater blame can be attributed to those, like the French, who, in the 1990s
and through the 1994 killings themselves continued to befriend and arm the Haby-
arimana [Hutu] government. But the circle of blame extends much wider and in-
cludes Kofi Annan, who ignored warnings of the impeding genocide; all members
of the U.N., and particularly the Security Council, who ... failed to send the 5000
troops that, it is estimated, might have prevented the vast majority of the killings.").
79 Mutua, supra note 46, at 176.
268 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 13
Rwanda."' 0 On the other hand, many argue that the existence of the tribu-
nals themselves "sends a powerful message. ... [and] stimulate[s] the devel-
opment of law."' 8 1 While the criticism of the tribunals is deserved, tribunals
have nonetheless illustrated that it is possible for heads of state to be held
accountable for crimes against humanity. However, the restrictive form of
head-of-state immunity applied by the ICTY and ICTR exists only to try
individuals for alleged international crimes that are sanctioned by the U.N.
The ability of courts outside the ICTY and ICTR to try former heads of
state for human rights abuses would further strengthen the concept of re-
strictive head-of-state immunity and thereby advance the human rights
movement.82
The Pinochet83 case squarely addressed the issue of trying a former
head of state before a foreign municipal court for allegedly committing
gross human rights violations in his domicile.8 4 In 1973, after staging a
successful coup against elected leader Salvador Allende, General Pinochet
became the President and Commander in Chief of the Republic of Chile. 85
Soon after, Pinochet established detention camps throughout Chile with tor-
ture becoming commonplace. 86 Pinochet resigned as head of state of Chile
in 1990, and became a senator for life. "In 1999, responding to a Spanish
request for extradition, the British House of Lords found that former Chil-
ean dictator Augusto Pinochet 'did not enjoy former head-of-state immunity
for acts of torture that he or his government committed during his reign.'"87
Pinochet argued that mass murder of civilians be considered "official acts,"
80 Alvarez, supra note 78, at 441.
81 Meron, supra note 73, at 555.
82 See generally Gilbert Sison, Note, A King No More: The Impact of the Pinochet
Decision on the Doctrine of Head-of-State Immunity, 78 WASH. U.L.Q. 1583
(2000).
83 Ex parte Pinochet, supra note 8.
84 Andrea Bianchi, Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 237, 237-38 (1999).
85 Sison, supra note 82, at 1588-89.
86 Id. at 1589. ("[F]rom September to December of 1973 . 13,500 people were
arrested and possibly 1,500 were killed . . . In addition, the regime carried out
political executions against former members of the Allende government and any-
one else deemed to be a danger.") (citing Nehal Bhuta, Justice Without Borders?
Prosecuting General Pinochet, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 499, 507 (1999)).
87 See generally KELLY, supra note 1, at 80 (quoting Christopher L. Blakesley,
Autumn of the Patriarch: The Pinochet Extradition Debacle and Beyond - Human
Rights Clauses Compared to Traditional Derivative Protections Such as Double
Criminality, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 15 (2000).
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thereby triggering an immunity defense. However, the House of Lords
found that torture should not be considered an official act for immunity
purposes.88 The Pinochet case was significant in showing that international
law was beginning to prioritize human rights and was shifting towards a
restrictive form of head-of-state immunity. 9 The Pinochet case affirmed
more then just a restrictive form of head-of-state immunity; it recognized
that foreign courts, not sanctioned by the U.N., have the ability to prosecute
visiting defendants who commit gross human rights violations in their home
country.
On March 29, 2006, former Liberian President Charles Taylor was
arrested and surrendered to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. While the
United States generally distanced itself from taking measures which could
be perceived as legitimizing the ICC, the United States nonetheless called
for Taylor's trial to be moved to the Hague. The United States proposed
that Taylor be prosecuted by the Special Court, but that the trial take place
using the facilities of the ICC in the Hague. Article 27 of the ICC statute
explicitly denies immunity to sitting heads of state for crimes against
humanity. 90
The acknowledgement of head of state accountability for interna-
tionally recognized crimes against humanity lays the framework for prose-
cuting Saddam Hussein. The Statute of the IST provides that "[t]he official
position of any accused person, whether as president. ..or in any other
capacity, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor miti-
gate punishment. No person is entitled to any immunity with respect to any
of the crimes stipulated.. "91 Nonetheless, Saddam's attorneys indicated
their intention to raise head-of-state immunity as a defense. 92 Early in the
trial's proceedings Saddam asserted that he deserved immunity because he
had been acting in an official capacity.93 This aimed to require the court to
recognize crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity as "official
88 Ex parte Pinochet, supra note 8.
89 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human
Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2183 (1999).
90 ICC Statute, supra note 38, at art. 27.
91 Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 15(c), Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231,
available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human-rights/Statute.htm [hereinafter IST
Statute].
92 See, e.g., Michael Kelly, Forum, Sovereign Immunity for Saddam? Not Likely.,
JURIST, Oct. 18, 2005, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2005/l0/sovereign-immu-
nity-for-saddam-not.php.
93 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Defiant Hussein Hears Charges in Court; Eleven Lieu-
tenants Are Also Arraigned Before Iraqi Judge, WASH. POST, July 2, 2004, at AO1,
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acts" for sovereign immunity purposes. As already seen in the Pinochet
case, heinous criminal acts against humanity are not considered "official
acts" for sovereign immunity purposes. 94 However, Saddam Hussein indi-
cated that he was entitled to a stronger form of current head-of-state immu-
nity. When asked his name, Saddam Hussein stated "I am Saddam Hussein,
president of the Republic of Iraq." 95 As President, Saddam Hussein enacted
legislation contrary to international law which granted absolute criminal
and civil immunity to himself.96 Saddam's statement that he was the current
president of Iraq rests on the idea that the invasion of Iraq was illegal under
international law, and therefore Saddam Hussein was still the legal Presi-
dent of Iraq.97 Consequently both Hussein and his lawyers asserted that the
invasion of Iraq was illegal.98 As intriguing as this argument is, it is un-
likely that the IST will put the U.S. invasion of Iraq on trial. 99 Furthermore,
in order to benefit from head-of-state immunity, a government official must
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19746-2004Jull.
html.
94 Ex parte Pinochet, supra note 8.
95 Chandrasekaran, supra note 93 ("When the judge asked whether he [Saddam
Hussein] was the former president of Iraq, Hussein insisted that he was the *pre-
sent' and *current' president."). But see Ramsey Clark, WHY I'M WILLING TO DE-
FEND HuSSEIN, L.A. TIMES, January 24, 2005, available at http://www.iacenter.org/
Iraq/rc-whydefend-sh012405.htm (note that Clark, one of Saddam Hussein's de-
fense attorneys, referred to Hussein as the "former president").
96 AL-DUSTUR AL-MO'AKAT [Provisional Constitution], art. 40 (Iraq), available at
http://www.mallat.com/iraq%20const%201970.htm.
97 Mikhail Wladimiroff, Prosecution, Defense and Investigation: Former Heads
of State on Trial, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 949, 964-65 (2005) ("[Sadaam's defense
team] may well argue that the head of state is immune under the Iraqi Constitution
as it stood at the time, claiming the present constitutional instruments null and void
as being promulgated by foreign occupational powers in violation of the Fourth
Geneva Convention or by an illegal government.") (citations omitted).
98 Doebbler Scharf Debate, supra note 51, at 23 ("I [Doebbler] have been to more
then sixty countries after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and I have not met
one lawyer with whom I had to argue about the illegality of the invasion, except in
the United States. In every other country I visited, and meeting with some of the
heads of state of those countries and some of their most senior lawyers, they were
unequivocally convinced that the United States' aggression against Iraq was a vio-
lation of international law, a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United
Nations... "); Chandrasekaran, supra note 93 (noting that Saddam Hussein had
remarked that the true criminal is President George W. Bush, and referred to the
newly established Iraqi power as an "occupational power").
99 See Kelly, supra note 92.
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be recognized by the immunizing state as the head of state; and at the time
of trial, it was doubtful that the newly elected regime in Iraq would recog-
nize Hussein as their current head of state. 100 Thus head-of-state immunity
would most certainly not have been afforded to Saddam Hussein.' 0'
Like Pinochet, Taylor, Kambanda, and Milosevic, the prosecution
of Hussein is significant in recognizing restrictive head-of-state immunity
as international law, and establishing that those who disobey the norms of
international law can be held accountable. 102 Former heads of state fear that
they too could be held accountable for crimes against humanity which they
may have committed. 10 3 However, while head of state accountability is im-
portant in addressing past crimes, whether or not its existence will deter
future crimes against humanity is questionable. 0 4 There are two main rea-
100 Hasson, supra note 41, at 142 ("Recognition [of a head of state] is considered a
discretionary function, with there generally being no legal duty to recognize the
validity of a state or its leader.") (citing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (4th ed. 1990)).
101 Mikhail Wladimiroff, Prosecution, Defense and Investigation: Former Heads
of State on Trial, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 949, 964-65 (2005).
102 KELLY, supra note 42, 1 at 118 and Hasson, supra note 41, at 154-55.
103 Ricardo Lagos, & Heraldo Mufioz, The Pinochet Dilemma, 114 FOREIGN POL'Y
26, 36 (1999) ("At the same time that Pinochet was being detained by British au-
thorities in London, the French government was hosting Democratic Republic of
Congo president Laurent Kabila, who stands accused of playing an active role in
the Rwandan genocide. Kabila was reportedly nervous about traveling to Europe
and inquired about formal assurances of diplomatic immunity prior to leaving his
home country."). See also Theodor Meron, Answering for War Crimes: Lessons
from the Balkans, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2, 7 (1997) (stating that indicted individu-
als have been "branded with the mark of Cain preventing them from traveling
abroad and instilling in them a fear of arrest by . foreign governments.").
104 Compare M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice In Iraq: An Appraisal of
the Iraq Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 327, 344 (2005) (stating that "an
Iraqi tribunal send[s] a particularly powerful message to Arab and Muslim
leaders .. . that individuals responsible for systematic repression are no longer
guaranteed impunity."), and Sison, supra note 82, at1584 (2000) ("[T]he Pinochet
decision sends a strong message to heads of state who would use their power to
commit human rights abuses."), with David Wippman, Essay, Atrocities, Deter-
rence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473, 488
(1999) (observing that international criminal prosecutions may "strengthen
whatever internal bulwarks help individuals obey the rules of war, but the general
deterrent effect of such prosecutions seems likely to be modest and incremental,
rather than dramatic and transformative."), and Payam Akhavan, Beyond Inpunit:
Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities? 95 AM. J. INT'L L.
7, 31 (2001) ("No one should entertain the illusion that the relative success of the
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sons for this. First, the application of head of state accountability has been
scattered and inconsistent, leaving many war criminals to wager that they
will not be prosecuted. 10 5 As noted in a hearing before the Foreign Relations
Committee, "a person stands a much better chance of being tried for taking
a single life than for killing ten thousand or a million."'1 6 Second, the nature
of individuals who commit crimes against humanity are unlikely to behave
rationally and be deterred by the risk of punishment. Consider Martha Mi-
now's discussion on tribunals' effect on deterring crimes against humanity:
Does the risk of punishment for human rights violations
make the leaders of authoritarian regimes reluctant to sur-
render power in the first place? Individuals who commit
atrocities on the scale of genocide are unlikely to behave as
"rational actors," deterred by the risk of punishment. Even
if they were, it is not irrational to ignore the improbable
prospect of punishment given the track record of interna-
tional law thus far. 10 7
Theodor Meron, a former ICTY judge and prominent head-of-state
accountability advocate, proclaims that the international tribunals "stimu-
late[d] the development of law," while also acknowledging that "a uniform
and definite corpus of international humanitarian law that can be applied
apolitically to internal atrocities" is also needed. 10 8
Clearly Saddam Hussein thought that he was above the grasp of
international law, and why shouldn't he have? One of the many cases that
was to be brought against Saddam Hussein involved his role in the killing
ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC process, or the engagement of national and foreign
courts, has somehow exorcised the specter of genocide and other massive crimes
from our midst.").
105 See Hasson, supra note 41, at 158 ("Why do states prosecute leaders such as
Noriega, Pinochet, and Milosevic, while others do not pursue sovereigns such as
Gaddafi, Mugabe, or Bush?").
106 Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest? Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 105th Cong. 72 (1998) (statement of Michael P. Scharf, Professor, New En-
gland School of Law).
107 MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 50 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
108 Meron, supra note 73, at 555.
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of 10,000 members of the Kurdish Barzani tribe in the 1980s. 109 In 1993,
Human Rights Watch issued a public report drawing global attention to
Saddam Hussein's systematic genocide of the Kurds.110 However, a recently
declassified U.S. State Department memo indicates that the United States
was aware of Hussein's actions against the Kurds as early as 1983; in par-
ticular, the memo notes Saddam's fondness for chemical weapons.I' None-
theless, the Reagan and Bush administrations were indifferent to the
genocide in Iraq, portraying friendly public relations with Hussein. 12 In
effect, this enabled Saddam Hussein to confidently commit further atroci-
ties against humanity throughout his regime.1 3 Saddam Hussein evaded ac-
countability as the world's superpowers appeared indifferent to his
atrocious human rights violations in the late 1970s, and throughout the
1980s and 1990s. 114 It is thus of no surprise that Saddam Hussein thought
he was above international law. The message that a 2005 indictment for
crimes committed in the 1980s sends to similarly situated violators of
crimes against humanity is not that of deterrence, but rather that of the sig-
nificance of maintaining good relations with the world's superpowers. Even
in the face of these critiques and limitations, it is nonetheless important that
109 See generally Michael Scharf, Basic Information about the Iraqi Special Tribu-
nal, Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, available at http:Ilwww.
law.case.edu/saddamtrial/content.asp?id=1.
110 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MIDDLE EAST WATCH REPORT: GENOCIDE IN IRAQ:
THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KURDS (1993).
111 Memo from Jonathan Howe, U.S. Dep't of State, to Sec'y of State Lawrence S.
Eagleberger, regarding Iraqi use of chemical weapons (Nov. 21, 1983), available at
George Washington University's National Security Archive, Briefing Book No. 82:
Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein, The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984, http:/
/www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq25.pdf (quoting Saddam
Hussein as saying "There is a weapon for every battle, and we have the weapon
that will confront great numbers.").
112 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT: IRAQ (1989), available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/1989/WR89/Iraq.htm#TopOfPage. There is also evidence
that U.S. administrations were supportive of Saddam Hussein's use of chemical
weapons. Patrick E. Tyler, Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of
Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, at Al.
113 For a detailed account of Saddam Hussein's crimes against humanity, see
KELLY, supra note 1 at 124-34.
114 See Bassiouni, supra note 104,at 359 ("[T]hroughout the entire period of the
Ba'ath regime (1968 to 2003), and during phases of its worst widespread and sys-
tematic human rights violations (1970 to 1988), the United States never formally
advanced the likelihood of its reliance on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
for military action in Iraq.").
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Saddam Hussein be held accountable for his crimes. While the implications
of holding Saddam Hussein accountable are disputed on an international
level, they are undeniably of grave importance to the Iraqi people and the
future of Iraq.
THE NEED FOR A JUST TRIAL IN POsT-CONFLICT IRAQ
Accountability of Saddam Hussein is important to Iraq for a num-
ber of reasons. Foremost among them, the prosecution of Saddam Hussein
plays a crucial role in allaying the wounds of Saddam's victims, their fami-
lies, and even bystanders." 5 In addition to healing individuals, the proper
prosecution of Saddam Hussein is vital to the collective future of Iraq. A
successful trial can "inspire societies that are reexamining their basic values
to affirm the fundamental principles of respect for the rule of law and for
the inherent dignity of individuals." ' 6 Furthermore, Iraqi support for the
prosecution of Hussein effectively expresses their society's moral condem-
nation of the atrocities Hussein and his Ba'ath party committed. 1 7 Recog-
nizing the illegality and inhumanity of the targeted nature of Hussein's
crimes towards various ethnic groups is significant in the initial phases of
forming a new cohesive democratic Iraq which recognizes the fundamental
rights of all ethnic groups." 8 To accentuate this, the IST emphasized that
the Iraqi people include "Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, Assyrians and other
ethnic groups, and its Shi'ites and Sunnis." 119 A perception of the IST as
unjust could further fuel a civil war by inflaming the pro-Saddam and ex-
Ba'athists of the Sunni insurgency. In order for Saddam's prosecution to be
considered a success, it is necessary that the Iraqi people view the outcome
as fair and just.
Saddam Hussein notoriously denied thousands of victims their due
process rights. At first impulse, it is tempting to utilize summary executive
punishment when dealing with criminals who have committed such atro-
cious crimes. 12° While summary executive punishment may momentarily
satisfy desires for revenge, a punishment guided by the rule of law is of
115 MINOW, supra note 107, at 50.
116 Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Dutm To Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542 (1991).
117 Michael J. Frank, Justice for Iraq, Justice for All, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 303, 308
(2004).
I's Id. at 310-11.
119 IST Statute, supra note 91, at art. 1.
120 Winston Churchill argued against a trial and for summary execution by a firing
squad for the Nazi leaders. BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE ROAD TO NUREMBERG 45-47
(1981).
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indispensable importance. The day following the capture of Saddam Hus-
sein, President Bush declared "now the former dictator of Iraq will face the
justice he denied to millions."":' A member of Iraq's transitional Governing
Council, Adnan Pachachi, proclaimed that Iraq's establishment of a fair and
just IST "shows we want to apply the rule of law and not let the desire for
revenge take over."'122 However, how Saddam Hussein was to be tried gen-
erated much debate.
CHOICE OF FORUM ISSUES
Only recently has the legal problem of sovereign immunity been
solved, so it is not surprising that we have "reached a stage where the issue
is typically no longer whether persons suspected of international crimes
should be judged, but the finer points of how they should be judged are
debated.""' 3 Indeed, once Saddam was captured, the debate revolved not
around whether Saddam can or should be tried, but rather around how he
should be tried. The debate centered on four models: a domestic tribunal,
the ICC, an international tribunal like the ICTY or ICTR, and a hybrid
tribunal. Ultimately, it was up to the United States to determine what forum
would prosecute Saddam Hussein.124
Domestic Tribunal
The argument for a domestic tribunal, which allows governments to
prosecute their own criminals, is rooted in the concepts of sovereignty and
121 President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Capture of Saddam
Hussein (Dec. 14, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/12/20031214-3.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
1 ' Bruce Zagaris, Iraq Governing Council Establish Special Tribunal and Saddam
Hussein is Arrested, 20 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REp. 76, 76 (2004).
123 Frederic Megret, Who Should Try Ousted Leaders? In Defense of Hybridity:
Towards a Representational Theory of International Criminal Justice, 38 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 725 (2005).
124 Hamza Hendawi, Iraqis Fear They Can't Put Saddam on Trial, TucSON ARI-
ZONA STAR, Jan. 10, 2004 (quoting the International Red Cross spokesman Ian
Piper as saying "It is up to the United States, as Iraq's occupier, to determine how
Saddam is to be tried."), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/
1055558/posts. However, because Hussein was a prisoner of war, the United States
was required to ensure that its choice guaranteed independence and impartiality in
accordance with the Geneva Convention. See generally Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, at art. 84, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135. See also Richard Goldstone, Justice in Iraq: The Trial of Saddam
Hussein, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1490, 1508 (2003-2004).
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the promotion of the rule of law. A domestic tribunal in Iraq has been
deemed by some as essential "because the trials can assist the transition to
democracy by demonstrating that no one is above the law."125 "The exercise
of punitive criminal accountability pursuant to domestic laws is at the heart
of our understanding of what it means to have a society built on the rule of
law . ..126 Another argument in support if a domestic tribunal to try Sad-
dam Hussein is that his victims were Iraqi, and consequently the Iraqis
should be able to try him. The counter argument to this is that in Iraq's
current political setting, "fragile democracies may not be able to survive the
destabilizing effects of politically charged trials."
' 12 7
The ICC
After years in the making, the first permanent International Crimi-
nal Court (the ICC) was established on July 17, 1998, by the U.N. Diplo-
matic Conference of Plenipotentiaries, and entered into force on July 1,
2002. 28 The ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.1 29 While traditional international tribunals are not estab-
lished until years after the crimes have occurred and been acknowledged,
the ICC has the ability to investigate and address crimes against humanity
as they happen. 130 Thus, the ICC provides for a consistent application of
head of state accountability for crimes against humanity. The ICC is re-
125 David M. Gersh, Note, Poor Judgment: Why the Iraqi Special Tribunal is the
Wrong Mechanism for Trying Saddam Hussein on the Charges of Genocide,
Human Rights Abuses, and Other Violations of International Law, 33 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. LAW 273, 280 (2004)(citing Orentlicher, supra note 116, at 2543)
126 Michael A. Newton, The Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 863,
864 (2005). See also Jerrold M. Post & Lara K. Panis, Tyranny on Trial: Personal-
ity and Courtroom Conduct of Defendants Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hus-
sein, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 823, 835 (2005) ("The Iraqi people feel strongly
motivated to prove to the world, that as a nation of law, Iraq is capable of carrying
out justice, against even its most brutal dictators. There is a strong desire to reestab-
lish the pride of Iraq's glorious past, when the Hammurabi code played an impor-
tant role in the development of the law - a tradition that was set aside during the
Saddam Hussein years.").
127 Orentlicher, supra note 116, at 2544.
I'8 ICC Statute, supra note 38.
129 Id. at art. 6, 7, and 8.
130 Id at art. 13. Art. 13 details the triggering mechanisms to exercise the ICC's
jurisdiction for the crimes listed in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the statute. The three
triggering mechanisms are 1) referral by a State, 2) Initiation by the Independent
Prosecuter, and 3) Referral by the Security Council.
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garded as highly credible because of its international composition and set of
well defined rules of procedure and evidence. 131
The ICC was the ideal forum to try Saddam Hussein. The ICC's
fair and just methods of trying Saddam Hussein would have resulted in the
trial's perceived legitimacy by the Iraqi people and international commu-
nity. An ICC trial of Saddam Hussein also would have served to establish
norms of the application of international law once crimes against humanity
have been committed. However, it was highly unlikely that the ICC would
exercise jurisdiction over Saddam Hussein as the ICC's jurisdiction is pri-
marily limited to crimes committed after 2002.112 This was further com-
pounded by the recent U.S. administration's blatant disdain for the ICC. 13 1
Nonetheless, it was conceivable that the ICC could have been able to exer-
cise jurisdiction over Saddam Hussein. The Rome Statute of the ICC en-
courages states to exercise jurisdiction over those responsible for internal
crimes. 3 4 The ICC was designed as a court of last resort that can only
operate when a state with jurisdiction cannot or will not act. 135 The ICC can
only exercise jurisdiction if a state with existing jurisdiction is unwilling or
unable to prosecute. 13 6 If the ICC finds that the domestic tribunal is "unwill-
ing or unable to prosecute," it is not completely inconceivable that the ICC
could exercise jurisdiction and take over a domestic tribunal. 3 7 While this
was plausible, it was highly unlikely that the ICC would usurp jurisdiction
from the IST over Saddam Hussein.
131 See id, at art. 63-76; see also Danielle Tarin, Note, Prosecuting Saddam and
Bungling Transitional Justice in Iraq, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 467, 528 (2005).
132 ICC Statute, supra note 128, at art. 11.
133 See generally, Remigius Chibueze, United States' Objection to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court: A Paradox of "Operation Enduring Freedom," 9 ANN.
SURV. INT'L COMP. L. 19 (2003). Note that the U.S. is not a signing party to the
ICC Statute, supra, note 38.; see also letter from John R. Bolton to U.N. Sec'y
Gen'l Kofi Annan, reprinted in KELLY, supra note 1 at 61; see also Kenneth Roth,
Trv Saddam in an International Court, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 15 2003 (noting
that the Bush Administration pushed for a domestic trial to further undermine the
legitimacy of the ICC).
134 ICC Statute, supra note 38, at pmbl. ("The Court's jurisdiction is complemen-
tary to national criminal jurisdictions.")
135 See id. at prmbl., art 1, art. 17, and art. 19, para. 2(b).
136 Id. at art. 17.
137 Id, See also, Tarin, supra note 131, at 529-30 (2005).
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International Tribunals
An international tribunal is usually located outside the country
where the crimes occurred and is composed of international judges and
prosecutors. The Nuremberg tribunal, the Tokyo tribunal, the ICTY, and the
ICTR are all examples of international criminal tribunals. Supporters of in-
ternational tribunals argued that a removed tribunal would create an objec-
tive distance between the judges and Saddam, rendering judgments against
him more authoritative.13 On the other hand, dissenters noted that Sad-
dam's crimes were domestic in nature and "[could] only be understood by
reference to political projects that took form within a given polity" 139 How-
ever, U.N. judges and prosecutors of international tribunals are renowned as
experts in trying complex crimes against humanity cases. 140 International
tribunals are also argued to have more of an overall deterrent effect because
they have a broader reach. 141 Regardless of these arguments, the likelihood
of an international tribunal being established to prosecute Saddam Hussein
was bleak from the onset for a number of reasons. Most importantly, there
was no existing international court that could exercise jurisdiction over Sad-
dam Hussein. 142 Therefore, in order for Hussein to be tried before an inter-
national tribunal, a U.N. Security Council would have had to establish such
a tribunal "from scratch."' 143 The use of an international tribunal was further
deterred by the fact that the Bush administration has amply demonstrated its
disdain for working with international bodies, in particular the ICC.144
"Given the outright hostility that the Bush administration has shown toward
international criminal justice and the recent testimony of the U.S. War
138 Megret, supra note 123.
139 Id. at 729.
140 See generally. Michael J. Kelly, The Tricky Nature of Proving Genocide
Against Saddan Hussein Before the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
983 (2005).
141 Megret, supra note 123, at 728-729. However, the author notes that this argu-
ment is deflated by the fact that it is logistically and politically impossible for
international tribunals to systematically react to all occurrences of international
crimes. Id. at 729.
142 KELLY, supra note 1 (noting that the ICJ in The Hague only has jurisdiction
over states, while the ICTY and the ICTR only have jurisdiction for the criminal
events that unfolded in the conflicts in those countries); ICC Statute, supra note 38,
at art. 11 (explaining that the ICC has jurisdiction only over crimes committed on
or after July 1, 2002).
13 Statute of the ICTY, supra note 61; Statute of the ICTR, supra note 69. See
also Kelly, supra note 141 at 1001.
144 Kelly, supra note 141, at 1000.
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Crimes Ambassador that the ad hoc tribunals should end their work by
2008, it seems highly unlikely that the United States would support their
proliferation."' a41 In general, critics of the Bush Administration state that
United States' support of a domestic tribunal is reflective of the Bush Ad-
ministration prioritizing its own ideology over that of the Iraqi people. A
domestic tribunal of "Iraqis selected by [a U.S.] picked Governing Council
will be less likely to reveal embarrassing aspects of Washington's past sup-
port for Saddam Hussein... and, most important, less likely to enhance...
the legitimacy of the detested International Criminal Court."'146
Hybrid Tribunals
Hybrid tribunals seek to address the problems of both domestic and
international tribunals by employing a combination of domestic and interna-
tional actors.147 A hybrid tribunal was used in Sierra Leone, employing in-
ternational and domestic judges, prosecutors and administrative staff. 48 In
regards to the IST, a hybrid tribunal was widely regarded as a solution to
the alleged competency problems of the Iraqi courts, judges and prosecu-
tors. 149 Commentators argued that international assistance to the IST is nec-
essary to ensure a fair and just trial. 150 However, critics of the hybrid
tribunal argue that it does little to help rebuild the local judiciary and that it
is not perceived as legitimate by civilians. 15 1 Furthermore, the United States
was unlikely to support a hybrid tribunal because like the international tri-
145 William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of Inter-
national Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (2002).
146 Roth, supra note 133 (noting that the Bush Administration pushed for a domes-
tic trial to further undermine the legitimacy of the ICC).
147 See generally Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 295 (2003).
148 Diane F. Orentlicher, Venues for Prosecuting Saddam Hussein: The Legal
Framework, ASIL INSIGHTS, Dec. 2003, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/
insigh 124.htm#ednref6.
149 Goldstone, supra note 124, at 1506-07; See also Roth, supra note 133.
150 See generally, Goldstone, supra note 124.
151 Gersh, supra note 125, at 281-82.
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bunal, a hybrid tribunal is sanctioned by the U.N.,1 52 and as discussed below
would not offer the death penalty as punishment. 153
Death Penalty Issues
The debate on the application of an international versus a domestic
tribunal model was affected by the issue of the death penalty. Permitted by
Iraqi law, the death penalty for Saddam Hussein is a viable punishment in a
domestic tribunal. 54 However, the death penalty is not available to U.N.
sanctioned international courts.'55 From the standpoint of fairness, guilty
persons should receive punishment that is proportional to their crimes. 156
While some may argue that execution was the only penalty sufficient to
address Hussein's crimes, it can be argued that there is no punishment that
is proportional to his crimes. There was also the argument that the death
penalty would provide Hussein with an easy exit; instead, affording Hussein
no more than the legal minimum of humane treatment would have ensured
152 Note that the Sierra Leone Court was created via the Agreement between the
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, available at http://www.sierra-leone.
org/specialcourtagreement.html. These discussions were mandatory pursuant to SC
Res. 1315, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000).
151 Gersh, supra note 125, at note 196. See also Orentlicher, supra note 149
("[T]he Iraqi Governing Council's desire to retain the death penalty presents a sig-
nificant impediment to the creation of such a hybrid court operating with U.N.
support. Neither the United Nations nor most of the United States' European allies
would participate in a court that could impose capital punishment.").
154 Initially, the Coalition Provisional Authority suspended the use of the death
penalty in Iraq. See COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, ORDER No. 7, § 3 (June
10, 2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/#Regulations (sus-
pending the use of the death penalty in Iraq). However, the new Iraqi government
has reinstated the death penalty originally stipulated in the Iraqi Penal Code No 111
for 1969.
155 International human rights law favors the abolition of capital punishment. See
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty. G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/128 (Dec. 15, 1989), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/coun-
tries/ratification/12.htm (60 states were parties as of March 13, 2007). See also,
BBC Monitoring International Reports, Iraqi Cabinet Reinstates Death PenaltY,
Sept. 27, 2004.
156 Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution and the Secondary Aims of Punishment, 44 AM.
J. JURIS. 105, 115 (1999).
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that he would truly suffer for his crimes. 15 7 However Hussein's victims may
have objected to him being spared the death penalty as they "[would] not
[have] want[ed] the grand author of their miseries to live out his life in
comparative comfort under the liberal prison regime in Finland with full
visiting rights, telephone access and a weekly ration of condoms." ' While
executing Hussein may have assisted in his victims' healing, it also posed
the danger of inciting more violence from his followers. Executing Hussein
also had the potential of turning him into a martyr, especially given the
Sunnis' perception of the IST as unfair. 159 It is important to note that the
majority of countries and international human rights law favors the aboli-
tion of capital punishment. 60 Nonetheless, the current U.S. administration
appeared adamant that the death penalty should be available for Saddam
Hussein. Some argue that the United States' desire for Saddam Hussein's
execution is the underlying reason why the United States was opposed to
U.N. or ICC involvement with his prosecution. 161
The IST was established by the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing
Council on December 10, 2003, and approved by the Iraqi Transitional Na-
tional Assembly on August 11, 2005.162 The IST has jurisdiction over Iraqi
nationals accused of committing genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and certain other crimes under Iraqi law committed inside or
outside of Iraq between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003.163 Located in Bagh-
dad, and composed of Iraqi judges and prosecutors, the IST is in theory a
domestic judiciary. 164 However, the IST is admittedly influenced by inter-
national expertise. 165 Article 4(d) of the IST provides that "[t]he Governing
Council, if it deems necessary, can appoint non-Iraqi judges who have ex-
157 Robertson, supra note 53, at 669-70 (suggesting sending Slobodan Milosevic
and Saddam Hussein to the Falkland Islands to -'shiver away their last years
[rather than] giving them an easy and quick exit on the gallows").
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Second Optional Protocal, supra note 156.
161 Roth, supra note 133; but see Robertson, supra note 53, at 670-71 (noting that
current Iraqi "President Talibani, who will have the power to commute [Saddam
Hussein's] sentence, is a life-long opponent of the death penalty.").
162 Scharf, supra note 109.
163 See IST Statute, supra note 91, at art. 10.
164 IST Statute, supra note 91, at art. 28 ( "The judges, investigative judges, prose-
cutors and the Director of the Administration Department shall be Iraqi nationals
. . "1).
165 "[T]he drafters of the statute consulted international experts in the field ...
[and] concluded that, with international assistance, the Iraqi judicial process would
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perience in the crimes encompassed in this statute, and who shall be persons
of high moral character, impartiality and integrity." 166 In effect, it appears
that the U.S. has evaded and perhaps undermined the U.N. by establishing a
domestic tribunal with international aspects. While locating Hussein's trial
in Iraq allowed the tribunal to be "more responsive to the needs ...of
victims and the affected society[,] it also carrie[d] dangers: localization can-
not come at the expense of fundamental fair trial rights .... 167
CRITIQUES OF THE IST
The IST had a number of flaws. The problems associated with the
IST undermined the tribunal's perceived legitimacy. 168 This further jeopard-
ized security in an already hostile Iraq.
Location
The location of the IST proved to be one of its major downfalls.
The IST is located in Baghdad, Iraq where the political climate is highly
polarized and very unsafe. 169 The highly dangerous nature of the location of
the IST greatly challenged its legitimacy. Human Rights Watch issued the
following statement following the first assassination of one of Saddam's
defense attorneys: "We are gravely concerned that this killing will have a
chilling effect on the willingness of competent lawyers to vigorously defend
the accused in these cases. Such an outcome will seriously undermine the
ability of the court to provide a fair trial." 170 This "chilling effect" also
extends to judges, prosecutors, and witnesses. As Justice Richard Goldstone
critiques, "[h]ow can you have a trial with bombs going off daily, people
be able to pursue an accountability process." Iraqi Special Tribunal website, availa-
ble at http://www.iraqispecialtribunal.org/en/about/overview.htm.
166 IST Statute, supra note 91, at art. 4(d). Other provisions require the appoint-
ment of non-Iraqi nationals "to act in advisory capacities or as observers." Id., arts.
6(b), 7(n) and 8(j).
167 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE FORMER IRAQI GOVERNMENT ON TRIAL I (2005),
available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraql005/iraqi005.pdf.
168 JUDGING DUJAIL supra note 5 (detailing the flaws of the IST and calling for the
overturning of the verdict).
169 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAQ: DEFENSE IN DANGER (2005), available at http://
hrw.org/english/docs/2005/10/21/iraq 1911.htm ("These trials are commencing in
an environment of severe insecurity. Everyone participating in the trial process -
judges, prosecutors, victims, witnesses and defense counsel - are exposing them-
selves to grave risks. We have already seen successful and unsuccessful assassina-
tion attempts against a judge, prosecutor and other court staff.").
170 Id.
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being attacked daily?"' 71 Spokesman for Iraqi Prime Minister, Dr. Laith
Kubba, stated that "the Iraqi government is committed to protecting the
judges, the witnesses, lawyers, and all those who are involved in the trial of
Saddam Hussein, and will not be deterred from pursuing the trial. ' 172 None-
theless, the IST in Baghdad put all parties involved in the judicial process in
grave danger. The location of the IST has proven to be one of its major
downfalls.
Competency of Iraqi Courts and Judges
The competency of the Iraqi courts and judges was challenged as
insufficient to act as the framework for the IST. "[T]here have been no
independent courts sitting in Iraq since 1968 ...[T]here are ...only a
handful of judges who are still there who were judges before 1968 ... [and
there is no] pool of independent prosecutors who are available."' 173 Iraq
once had a proud legal tradition based on one of the world's oldest codifica-
tions, the 3750 year old Code of Hammurabi. 174 However, the rule of law in
Iraq disappeared as the courts of the Ba'ath party were subjected to the will
of an authoritarian government. 175 Furthermore, the IST Statute understand-
ably precluded these judges from serving on the IST.' 76 This left mostly
inexperienced, low-level judges to serve on the IST, as most of the senior
judges in Iraq were members of the Ba'ath Party. 177 This is compounded by
the fact that genocide is considered the most complicated crime to try. 178
Many questioned if the IST was prepared to handle such complex cases.
The IST was regulated by the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure. 179 How-
ever, the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure "does not contemplate the type
of complex litigation involving multiple victims that presents itself in this
171 Goldstone, supra note 124, at 1505-06.
172 CNN.com, Gunmen Kill Hussein Co-Defendant's Lawyer: Assassinations Raise
Questions Over Resumption of Trial, Nov. 8, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
WORLD/meast/ 1l/08/iraq.main/index.html.U.S.
173 Goldstone, supra note 124, at 1505-06.
174 Bassiouni, supra note 104, at 328 (citing JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A PANORAMA
OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 86-93 (1936)).
175 Stanley A. Roberts, Note, Socio-Religious Obstacles to Judicial Reconstruction
in Post-Saddam Iraq, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 367, 380 (2005).
176 IST Statute, supra note 91, at art. 33.
177 Doebbler Scharf Debate, supra note 51, at 24.
178 See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
CRIME OF CRIMES 345-417 (2000).
179 IST Statute, supra note 91, at art. 16. See also, Qanun Usul al-Muhakamat al-
Jaza-ia [Criminal Procedure Law of 1971], Law No.23 (Iraq).
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context. Iraqi criminal procedure is based on individual cases presented by
victims as complainants and investigated only by an investigative judge." 180
Furthermore, the Iraqi judges and prosecutors did not have experience in
trying crimes of this nature. To combat these problems, IST judges and
prosecutors traveled to The Hague for a three day conference with jurists
from the ICTY and ICC. 181 Although commendable, it is doubtful that at-
tendance at a three-day conference served to compensate for experience.
Impartiality of Iraqi Judges
The process of appointing judges to the IST raised concerns about
their independence and impartiality. 8 2 The IST Statute contains a blanket
provision prohibiting any former members of the Ba'ath party to serve as
judges. 183 By doing so, the IST assumed that all Ba'ath party members were
devotees of Saddam Hussein. This ignores the fact that some Ba'ath party
members were not sincere in their devotion to Hussein. Many Iraqis joined
the Ba'ath party out of fear. 184 President Bush acknowledged this when he
said that Hussein "showed no love for the Iraqi people, particularly those
that dared express an opinion other than his."'185 A judge's prejudice is not
solely related to sincere membership in the Ba'ath party. Just as a Ba'ath
devotee would be a biased judge, a judge who was victimized by Hussein
would be equally affected by bias. 186 However the IST Statute does not
disqualify judges who were victimized by Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath
regime. Article 5 of the IST Statute specifically qualifies judges who were
politically prosecuted by the Ba'ath regime. 187 In one instance, a judge who
had been victimized by the Ba'ath regime was asked to sit on the appellate
division of the IST.18 The judge, Dara Nureddin, had previously been im-
prisoned by the Ba'ath regime after declaring as legally invalid a decree
180 Bassiouni, supra note 104, at 350 (citing Qanun Usul al-Muhakamat al-Jaza-ia
[Criminal Procedure Law of 1971], Law No. 132 (Iraq)).
181 Kelly, supra note 141, at 1003.
182 Bassiouni, supra note 104, at 367-72. See also FORMER IRAQI GOVERNMENT
ON TRIAL supra note 167.
183 IST Statute, supra note 91, at art. 33.
184 Gersh, supra note 125, at 296-97.
185 Id.
186 Bassiouni, supra note 104, at 371.
187 IST Statute, supra note 91, at art. 5(f)(1)(i) (stating that a judge shall be dis-
qualified [if] "[h]e or she has a criminal record including a felony unless the felony
is a political or false charge made by the Ba'ath Party regime").
188 Bassiouni, supra note 104, at n. 246.
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issued by Saddam. 189 Saddam's defense attorneys also questioned the im-
partiality of current judge Rauf Abdel Rahman, claiming that he is a native
of the Kurdish village of Halabja. 190 Halabja was the target of a 1988
chemical attack; an attack some regard as the one of the most horrific inci-
dents for which Saddam Hussein is responsible. 91 The exclusion of former
Ba'athists and the presence of Ba'ath victims as IST judges created a politi-
cally polarized tribunal which could only be viewed as biased.1 92 Ideally,
the IST statute would have been amended to articulate impartiality of
judges on a case by case basis.
Procedural and Evidentiary Issues
The IST Statute is guided by the Iraqi Code of Criminal Proce-
dure. 193 The IST, and its guiding Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure have
been criticized for not requiring that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, not guaranteeing Saddam Hussein access to counsel, and requiring
that Saddam be executed immediately upon a judgment of guilt.
A widely accepted component of a fair trial is that the accused be
found guilty only if the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 194 The
Iraqi criminal law allows defendants to be convicted on the "satisfaction'" of
the judge. 195 A fair conviction "must be based on a reasoned judgment that
demonstrates the establishment of each of the elements of the crime beyond
reasonable doubt."' 196
189 Id. Ironically, Judge Dara was released early from prison along with thousands
of others, many common criminals, when Hussein decided shortly before the U.S.
invasion that doing so would create insecurity during a potential occupation. Id.
190 Lawyers Demand Disqualification of Saddam Judge, MIDDLE EAST TIMES (Feb.
26, 2006), available at http://www.metimes.com/print.php?StorylD=20060224-
044253-6244r.
191 See generally KELLY, supra note 1, at 128, giving a detailed description of
Hussein's crimes against humanity.
192 Bassiouni, supra note 104, at 369. See also FORMER IRAQI GOVERNMENT ON
TRIAL, supra note 167.
193 IST Statute, supra note 91, at art. 16.
194 ICC Statute, supra note 38, at art.66(3); Rule of Procedure and Evidence, Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Rule 87(A); Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rule 87(A).
195 Law on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments, Number 23 of 1971, Decree
No. 230 Issued by the Revolutionary Command Council, Feb. 14, 1971, par. 213
[hereinafter Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code], available at http://www.law.case.edu/
saddamtrial/documents/IraqiCriminalProcedureCode.pdf.
196 FORMER IRAQI GOVERNMENT ON TRIAL, supra note 167, at 8.
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A fair trail requires a competent defense, which entails unrestricted
and regular access to legal counsel of one's own choice at all stages of a
criminal proceeding. Khalil Dulaimi, Saddam Hussein's chief defense law-
yer, claimed that he and other defense lawyers for Hussein were not al-
lowed access to their client.' 97
Article 27 of the IST's Statute mandates that punishment must be
executed within 30 days of the date a guilty judgment becomes final regard-
less of pending charges.198 A guilty verdict of the first charge against Sad-
dam Hussein was very likely. 199 Under Article 27, Saddam did not stand
trial for his additional charges as he was executed immediately after the
commencement of the first trial. This is exceptionally inconsistent with
many of the goals of trying Saddam Hussein for his crimes against human-
ity. "A possible execution of Hussein at the end of his first trial could leave
unanswered questions, however, and might disappoint Iraqis seeking justice
for other crimes of the Saddam regime. ' 200 A premature execution of Sad-
dam Hussein demonstrated the IST's eagerness to "be done with him." This
supports the argument that the IST was a mechanism of victor's revenge.
Courtroom Behavior
Saddam Hussein's antics in the courtroom caused many onlookers
to doubt the legitimacy and credibility of the IST.20 1 Granted, Saddam's
outbursts and hunger strike were not exactly the stuff dream tribunals are
made of.20 2 However Saddam's behavior is not unique; such grandiose defi-
197 BBC.co.uk, Lawyers 'denied access to Saddam' (Feb. 5, 2006), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middle-east/4684238.stm (last viewed March 12,
2007).
198 IST Statute, supra note 91, at art. 27.
199 Kelly, supra note 141 (explaining that the first charge against Hussein is con-
sidered the easiest of all the charges for the prosecution to prove). See also Katerina
Ossenova, Prosecutor Says Saddarn Cannot Rely on Later Trials to Delay Hanging,
JURIST, Feb. 19, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/02/
prosecutor-says-saddam-cannot-rely-on.php ("Moussawi [the IST Chief prosecu-
tor] estimated that the current trial ha[d] 'passed the 75% mark' and indicated
that an appeals panel ha[d] already been assembled.").
200 Ossenova, Id.. See also Posting of Leila Sadat to Grotian Moment: The Saddam
Hussein Trial Blog, Case Western School of Law, available at http://law.case.edu/
saddamtrial/entry.asp?entry-id=95 (Mar. 9, 2006, 7:59 CST).
201 Undignified but not a Farce, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.econ-
omist.com/opinion/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story-id=5524516.
20' Id. ("Since the trial began in October, the former dictator and his co-defendant
half-brother have been having a high old time denouncing the American-backed
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ance has become standard courtroom behavior for former dictators.203
Milosevic employed similar courtroom behavior, which resulted in in-
creased support from his followers in Serbia, and a negative impact on the
perception that his trial was legitimate.20 4 "Thus the parallels we have seen
with the style of Milosevic in the first court appearance of Saddam Hussein,
questioning the legitimacy of the court, playing defiantly to his radical Arab
supporters and to his reputation in Arab history, are not mere coincidence
but probably reflect[ ] admiration for the success of the Milosevic tactics
and a conscious resolve to model his courtroom conduct after the Serbian
dictator. '205 While Milosevic's antics may have been aggravating to the
ICTY, they did not prove successful in vindicating him. Therefore, some
argue that the legitimacy of the IST was not affected by Saddam's antics.20 6
However, the ability of the ICTY to handle Milosevic' s courtroom behavior
should be attributed to the fact that the ICTY judges and prosecutors are
internationally renowned experts in their field. The same can not be said for
the IST judges. Therefore, Saddam's courtroom behavior strategy may have
proven more successful in the IST than Milosevic's similar strategy at the
ICTY.
U.S. Involvement
Both Saddam and critics alike argued that the IST was an extension
of the U.S. government 0.2 7 This further contributes to the notion of victor's
justice. In trial, Saddam Hussein stated that the IST was "'all a theater'
tribunal as 'the daughter of a whore', hurling abuse at the judges, staging walk-
outs, railing against Iraq's occupation by 'foreign invaders,' demanding repeated
adjournments, and, now, mounting a hunger strike.")
203 Michael P. Scharf & Ahran Kang, Errors and Missteps: Key Lessons the Iraqi
Special Tribunal Can Learn from the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, 38 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 911, 920 (2005).
204 Jerrold M. Post & Lara K. Panis, Tyranny on Trial: Personality and Courtroom
Conduct of Defendants Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, 38 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 823, 825-6 (noting that "[Milosevic] played to his supporters back in
Serbia, put his accusers on the defensive, and in general, turned the trial into an
international spectacle.").
205 Id. at 829. Accord Scharf & Kang, supra note 203, at 920 (noting that Hussein
and Milosevic share the same lawyer, former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey
Clark).
206 ECONOMIST, U.S., supra note 201.
207 But see Frank, supra note 117, at 323.
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designed by President Bush . . . to win re-election. '208 The IST has been
perceived as an extension of the U.S. government for a number of reasons.
First, Saddam was captured and the tribunal was established 209 while Iraq
was being occupied by the U.S. 210 Some commentators believed that the
IST was illegitimate on its face because it was created by an occupying
force.211 Under the Geneva Convention, occupying powers have limited
powers to alter the legislation of the country they occupy. 21 2 However, sub-
sequent approval of the IST statute by the Iraqi Transitional Government in
October 2005 has somewhat enhanced the perceived legality of the IST by
international legal scholars. Despite the Iraqi Transitional Government ap-
proval of the IST statute, the trial is still viewed as closely associated with
politics of occupation. The drafting of the IST statute by the United States
CPA is noted by some as further evidence that the IST is an extension of the
United States. The IST is also viewed as being controlled by the United
States because the United States funds it.213 U.S. involvement and control
appears to be an inherent feature of the IST. As former U.N. Appeal Judge,
Richard Goldstone notes:
If this court is in fact or in perception a front for the United
States, that is obviously going to be self-destructive. It is
not going to bring any substantial justice to the victims.
And the international community . is simply going to
reject it. It would be a recipe for failure. 214
2o8 CNN.com, Defiant Saddam Rejects Court Charges, July 1, 2004, http:/lwww.
cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/07/01/iraq.saddam/ (last visited Feb.26, 2007).
209 IST Statute, supra note 91.
210 See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Venues for Prosecuting Saddam Hussein:
The Legal Framework, ASIL INSIGHTS,, Dec. 2003. available at http://www.asil.
org/insights/insighl24.htm#_ednref6.
211 Bassiouni, supra note 104, at 361-63. Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T S. 287.
212 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
supra note 212, at art. 70.
213 Kelly, supra note 141, at 1003 (noting that the U.S. annual budget for support-
ing the IST exceeds $75 million.); See DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN
AFFAIRS, REPORT ON IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION, Sec. 2207, App. I (Oct.
2005), available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/2207/oct2005/htmV54729.
htm (noting that an additional $128 million has been allocated for investigating
crimes against humanity).
214 Goldstone, supra note 124, at 1506.
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Victor's Revenge
Criticism of the Nuremberg trials has continued to plague modern
tribunals. The IST has drawn sharp criticism that it punished the vanquished
while sparing the victors. 215 Like its Nuremberg predecessor, the Iraqi Spe-
cial Tribunal was implemented such that it prosecutes a select few members
of the defeated regime, while leaving members of the invasion coalition
unaccountable for their actions. 216 However, while M. Cherif Bassiouni ac-
knowledges that the trials may be perceived as "victors' vengeance," he
continues that:
selective justice, imperfect as it is, does no injustice to
those who deserve prosecution. In the light of the wide-
spread atrocities committed by the Ba'ath regime, no one
can argue that the persons considered for prosecution do
not deserve to face justice. Nonetheless, every effort should
be made to enhance the legitimacy, credibility, and fair out-
comes of their prosecutions. 21 7
The abovementioned problems with the IST, are not a reflection of
a uniquely insufficient Iraqi justice system, but rather these problems are
inherent to domestic tribunals tasked with trying heads of state for crimes
against humanity. Domestic tribunals are not experienced or equipped in the
necessary areas of international law and procedure which are necessary to
try such sophisticated cases. On the other hand, the ICC is fully capable of
trying such complex cases because of its "entirely international composition
215 Bassiouni, supra note 104, at 337 ("In the Arab world and elsewhere, these
prosecutions will be perceived as victors' vengeance or unfair because they are
selective."). See also Diane Marie Amann, Saddam Hussein and the Impartialit'
Deficit in International Criminal Justice, 13-14 (Working Paper No. 813249,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=813249.
216 C.P.A. Order No. 17 § 2 (3), The Coalition Provisional Authority (Jun. 27,
2004), http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD 17_Status_
ofCoalition RevwithAnnexA.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2007) (stating that
members of the Coalition forces shall be "subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
their Sending States."); see generally Ryan J. Liebl, Rule of Lawm in Postwar Iraq:
From Saddam Hussein to the American Soldiers Involved in the Abu Ghraib Prison
Scandal, What Law Governs Whose Actions? 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 91, 107 (2005).
See also, Amann, supra note 216 ("Many hands enabled repression in Iraq. They
were not only Iraqi hands, but also, by all accounts, American, and British, and
others.' ")
217 Bassiouni, supra note 104, at 337.
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[and] set of well defined rules of procedure and evidence. ' 218 Moreover, the
ICC does not challenge state sovereignty, but rather it encourages individ-
ual states to exercise jurisdiction over violators of the most serious crimes.
Article 5 of the ICC statute lists the most serious crimes which it has juris-
diction over'.2 9 Specifically listed in Article 5 is the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. 220 Arti-
cles 6, 7, and 8 go into great depth to clarify exactly how it defines geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.22' Moreover, the ICC can
only exercise jurisdiction if a state with pre-existing jurisdiction is unable or
unwilling to prosecute. 222 The language of the preamble emphasizes that
"The [ICC] established under this Statute shall be complementary to na-
tional criminal jurisdiction." 223 Therefore, the Rome Statute of the ICC en-
courages states to exercise jurisdiction over those responsible for internal
crimes. 224 A strengthened and supported ICC ultimately leads to global rec-
ognition of human rights, and a universally accepted form of restrictive
head-of-state immunity. This global recognition will result in a "trickle
down" effect in which individual states adopt the principles set forth by the
ICC. In theory, a strengthened ICC would encourage individual states to
develop domestic legislature and procedures which recognize and address
crimes against humanity and a restrictive form of head-of-state immunity.
CONCLUSION
International law has only recently developed the ability to hold
former heads of state accountable for crimes against humanity. It is not
surprising that consistent principles of how to try violators of crimes against
humanity have not been established. A consistent. swift, and fair application
of international law once crimes have been committed against humanity is
needed to prevent and deter further crimes against humanity. This was illus-
trated by the international community's inaction towards Saddam Hussein
18 ICC Statute, supra note 38, at art. 63-76; see also Tarin, supra note 131, at 528
(citing Jess Bravin, "U.N. Panel Urges Prosecution of Sudan in ICC," WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 1, 2005, at A4); see also Kelly, supra note 141.
219 ICC Statute, supra note 38, at art. 5.
220 Id.
221 Id. at art. 6-8.
222 Id. at art. 17, and art. 19, para. 2(b).
223 Id. at, pmbl. This is further emphasized in Article 1 of the ICC Statute. Id. at
art. 1.
224 Id. ("The Court's jurisdiction is complementary to national criminal jurisdic-
tions.") The ICC is a court of last resort that can only operate when a state with
jurisdiction cannot or will not act.
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for his initial crimes against humanity, and the subsequent atrocities which
ensued. Rather than inconsistently reacting to mass atrocities years after
they occur, a proactive front needs to be taken; a task which would be best
served and enforced by the ICC. Furthermore, the support and endorsement
of the ICC by individual states would contribute to the development of do-
mestic laws and procedures of addressing crimes against humanity in indi-
vidual nation states.
The critiques of the IST illustrate that it did not provide a fair and
just trial for Saddam Hussein. It is clear that international judges and prose-
cutors with expertise in trying crimes against humanity were needed. It is
unfortunate that the ICC was not afforded the opportunity to prosecute Hus-
sein. An ICC trial over Saddam Hussein would have finally confirmed the
international community's intolerance for crime's against humanity and
would have undisputedly sent a message of deterrence to current and future
heads of state. Furthermore, the ICC's fair and just methods of trying Sad-
dam Hussein would have resulted in the trial's perceived legitimacy by the
Iraqi people, a perception which is necessary for the stability and future of
Iraq. Nonetheless, the IST and its downfalls have illustrated to the interna-
tional community the need for the ICC.

